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1. Introduction
In our original Dream-ESP meta-analysis (Storm, Sherwood, 
Roe, Tressoldi, Rock, & Di Risio, 2017), we defined Dream-
ESP as a “form of extra-sensory perception (ESP) in which 
a dreaming perceiver ostensibly gains information about a 
randomly selected target without using the normal sensory 
modalities or logical inference” (p. 120). For the period 1966 
to 2016, a homogeneous dataset of 50 studies yielded a 
mean z of 0.75 (ES = .20), with corresponding significant 
Stouffer Z = 5.32 (p = 5.19 × 10-8), suggesting that dream 
content can be used to identify target materials correctly 
and more often than would be expected by chance. The da-
taset was comprised of studies from two different periods:
 ▪ 14 studies from the 1960s to the mid-1970s— 
 the Maimonides Dream Lab (MDL) studies;
 ▪ 36 studies from the early-1970s to 2016—‘indepen- 
 dent’ (non-MDL) studies.
Although (a) the MDL dataset had a mean ES that was larg-
er (.33) than the mean ES for the non-MDL studies (.14), 
the difference was not statistically significant; no statisti-
cally significant ES differences were found between (b) ESP 
mode (telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition); (c) REM and 
non-REM monitoring; (d) ‘dynamic targets’ (e.g., movie-film) 
and ‘static targets’ (e.g., photographs); (e) same-perceiver 
studies and different-perceiver studies; (f) same-agent stud-
ies and different-agent studies; (g) single-perceiver studies 
and multiple-perceiver studies; and (h) single-subject stud-
ies (N = 1) and multiple-perceiver studies (N > 1). We also 
found that significant improvements in the quality of the 
studies was not related to ES, but ES did decline over the 
five-decade period. In addition, we found no effect size dif-
ference between groups of authors. We also conducted a 
Bayesian analysis: the 95% Highest Density Interval of pos-
terior probability (which indicates the most plausible 95% 
of the values in the posterior distribution) related to the ES 
ranged from 0.03 to 0.20 (mean ES = 0.12)—thus, the null 
hypothesis was rejected.
In a critique of our paper, Howard (2018) says he was 
“struck” by an “unusual feature” of our meta-analysis, and 
he suggested “the reported meta-analytic effect sizes are 
very large for psi research” (p. 224). We are surprised by this 
characterisation: The choice of phenomena from parapsy-
chology that are taken as comparators by Howard seems 
peculiar, since they focus on claims that bear little relation 
to dream-ESP (including effects of mental intention on dice 
rolls). In fact, according to Cardeña (2018), effect sizes for 
psi dream studies are similar to (or smaller than) those for 
other free response psi effects, including remote viewing 
and ganzfeld experiments.
Using our original database (Appendix A in Storm et al., 
2017, pp. 138-139), Howard (2018) replicates some of the 
effects we found in our meta-analysis, but he did not test 
for differences between ‘same sender’ and ‘different send-
er’, ‘single-perceivers’ and ‘multiple-perceivers’, ‘dynamic 
targets’ and ‘static targets’, or single-subject studies and 
multiple-perceiver studies; nor did he test whether improve-
ments in the study quality were related to ES. However, 
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Howard does argue that additional modern meta-analytic 
methods would yield results that “may be notably different” 
(p. 224)—e.g., extra outlier identification methods, inverse-
variance weighted meta-regressions, and within-group Co-
chran’s Q (we note, however, that Cochran’s Q is a measure 
of heterogeneity and tests the null hypothesis that all stud-
ies share a common effect size which has nothing to do with 
effect size comparisons). We do acknowledge in our paper 
that alternate analyses are possible and that our database 
may have imperfections.
Using our database, Howard performed an “inverse-vari-
ance weighted meta-analysis” (p. 224), and found a much 
smaller overall effect (r = .07), where r is effectively the same 
as ES (i.e., z/√n). Inverse-variance weighted meta-analysis 
effectively reduces the strength of effects in smaller studies, 
of which there are a number in the Storm et al. (2017) data-
base originating from the MDL. In fact, Howard claims “evi-
dence that a significant relationship exists between effect 
size and sample size, suggesting that the prior results may 
have been primarily driven by large effects found in small-n 
studies” (p. 224). Actually, Howard found the effect (as a 
correlation between standard error and effect size) was only 
“marginally significant” for the whole sample, Kendall’s τ = 
.165, p = .058. He cites Borenstein (2005), who suggests 
that this test is “often underpowered”, leading Howard to 
conclude that the “result suggests that a notable relation-
ship exists between sample size and effect size in the da-
taset” (p. 228). However, we suggest it is not wise to build 
a case on a marginal effect; besides which, a correlation 
between standard error and effect size is not the same thing 
as a correlation between sample size and effect size. This 
preliminary finding is indicative of similar problems through-
out Howard’s paper.
In response to Howard (2018), we will address a number 
of key methodological issues, and then contrast Howard’s 
findings with our past findings insofar as there are discrep-
ancies, and we will include a few revisions. We find that the 
chief concerns centre around sample size, and how to deal 
with outliers appropriately.
2. Publication Bias
In interpreting findings derived from a database of published 
studies it is important to consider the effects of any publica-
tion bias, particularly the tendency for non-significant stud-
ies to be under-represented in the public record. In extreme 
cases, this can lead to Type I errors if substantial numbers 
of null or negative studies are unavailable. Running a test 
advocated by Darlington and Hayes (2000) to test for publi-
cation bias, Storm et al. (2017) found 110 unpublished stud-
ies must exist to reduce the database to non-significance. 
Howard (2018) reports that his re-analysis
found a similar result: the failsafe N was 93 for the analy-
sis of all studies. However, the fail-safe N was noticeably 
smaller when the studies were separated by ESP mode: 
telepathy (0), clairvoyance (7), and precognition (0). This 
suggests that the current interpretations could be notice-
ably swayed by unpublished studies. (p. 225)
This peculiar outcome might be of interest if there was indi-
cation that editors and/or authors had a preference for te-
lepathy and precognition studies over clairvoyance studies. 
Otherwise, the fail-safe N is just fine, and the file-drawer 
argument has little support. However, and in the first place, 
the only justifiable reason to separate studies by modality 
is to test effect-size differences of the three modalities on 
the basis that they might involve fundamentally different psi 
processes, but the three effects did not differ: Storm et al. 
(2017, p. 127) did not find any differences in effect sizes 
by modality, and nor did Howard (2018, p. 226). We would 
argue that the rationale for testing for modality-dependent 
publication bias has to be theoretically grounded, and there 
does not appear to be a persuasive case for distinguishing 
among them, especially when in practice modalities are only 
differentiated operationally. Nonetheless, if Howard’s esti-
mate of 93 studies is legitimate, one can easily divide the 
93 according to the proportions of each of the three ESP 
modes in Howard’s Table 1 (p. 225), which has a total of 42 
studies broken down by modality (two studies are not cat-
egorized). Hence, there would be 46 hypothesized studies 
for telepathy (i.e., 21/42 = 50%); 27 hypothesized studies 
for clairvoyance (i.e., 12/42 = 29%), and 20 hypothesized 
studies for precognition (i.e., 9/42 = 21%). These break-
downs suggest the number of hypothesized studies hidden 
away in the legendary file-drawer is too great to explain the 
observed data.
In any case, Howard (2018) has it the wrong way around 
in saying his “current interpretations could be noticeably 
swayed by unpublished studies”, when in fact, “telepathy 
(0), … and precognition (0)” (p. 225), means there are no 
hypothetical unpublished studies for these two ESP modes, 
and thus no possible publication bias in the actual data for 
those modes. In effect, if we are going to talk about a pub-
lication bias, it seems the focus should not be on the whole 
sample (despite the significant Egger’s test result indicating 
bias; p. 225), but should be on clairvoyance as that ESP 
mode produced a significant effect (see p. 226), possibly 
attributable to publication bias—quantitatively, an amount 
somewhere between 7 and 27 non-significant studies 
tucked away in file-drawers would reduce the effect to non-
significance, but the other two ESP modes (telepathy and 
precognition) are off the hook. But then Howard disputes 
the finding of a significant effect for clairvoyance anyway, 
claiming the effect lacks “robustness” (p. 226). Note, how-
ever, that the effect size is still between .15 and .19.
Howard (2018) also argues that the inclusion of “imputed” 
(p. 226; i.e., alleged missing) studies would make the overall 
effect size non-significant. His Table 1 (p. 225) and Figure 1 
(p. 226) show there are nine ‘imputed’ studies and the effect 
size is reduced from .072 to.049, which is no longer statisti-
cally significant when including the implied missing studies 
from the trim-and-fill analysis” (p. 225); the 95% CI changes 
from [.02, .12] to [-.01, .11], thus embracing zero. Consider-
ing the criticisms we have already raised here about publi-
cation bias and our disputing its likelihood, the act of adding 
‘imputed’ studies is clearly nothing more than a theoretical 
exercise requiring justification.
3. Primary Analysis – Replications
Howard (2018) claims we made statistical decisions, includ-
ing “reporting unweighted effects” (p. 224), that may have 
produced results that he regards as “inflated” (p. 224). He 
performed an “inverse-variance weighted meta-analysis” 
on our database. Two of Howard’s analysis decisions seem 
to us to reflect a posteriori judgements that warrant com-
ment here: rationale for inclusion and exclusion of studies in 
the final analysis; and weighting of effect sizes for included 
studies.
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3.1. Selection of Studies for Inclusion
Guided by Cook’s distance values, Howard excluded four 
significantly positive studies (#19, #25, #43, and #47), but 
only one significantly negative study (#2)—we had already 
classed two of these studies as outliers (#2 and #47) and 
removed them to create a homogeneous dataset—raising 
questions about whether the other three studies (#19, #25, 
#43) should have been removed. Howard states:
Eight methods were applied to find outliers and influen-
tial cases, but I primarily considered three in determin-
ing these studies: studentized deleted residuals, Cook’s 
distance, and covariance rations (Viechtbauer & Cheung, 
2010). (p. 225)
Howard (2018) does not make clear his rationale for select-
ing three methods over the others available to him. Indeed, 
how to deal with outliers remains a controversial issue (see 
Orr, Sackett, & Dubois, 1991). There are other methods that 
could have been used (e.g., the ‘Winsorized estimator’, 
which is useful because it is relatively insensitive to outliers, 
but still gives a robust estimate of central tendency; Wilcox 
& Keselman, 2003). As an exercise, and starting with our 
homogeneous dataset (N = 50), we set an outlier removal of 
10% (which embraces the outliers in question), thus remov-
ing the lowest five and the highest five from the number set, 
and replacing them with the next closest entry. We found a 
Winsorized mean ES = 0.199; mean z = 0.73; and Stouffer 
Z = 5.18 (p = 1.11 × 10-7). These values are comparable to 
our original values.
There are still other methods that could have been used 
by Howard (2018)—studies that are detected as outliers 
can be down-weighted using a Random Effect Variance 
Shift Outlier model (see Majd, Ghobadi, Baghban, Ahmadi, 
& Sajjadi, 2014). More broadly, removal of outliers and in-
fluential cases tends to be guided by what a given author 
may “recommend” (Viechtbauer & Cheung, 2010, p. 115), 
rather than hard-and-fast rules. For example, we note that 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004) even recommend against out-
lier analyses altogether, with the main reason being that “it 
is almost impossible to distinguish between large sampling 
errors and true outliers (i.e. actual erroneous data)” (p. 110). 
For transparency we note that if all outliers are retained then 
this would give a Winsorized mean ES = 0.189; mean z = 
0.80; and Stouffer Z = 5.80 (p = 3.30 × 10-9).
Howard (2018) states: “After their removal, the outlier 
analyses indicated that one large outlier still remained (Van 
de Castle, 1971)” (p. 225). He removed this study, and pro-
vided justifications for his decision in his ‘Supplemental Ma-
terial B’. We agree with Howard’s concerns about the meth-
odology of this study (see also, Sherwood & Roe, 2003, for 
similar doubts). The removal of this study (not as an outlier 
but for methodological reasons) gives (for a corrected N = 
49) a Winsorized mean ES = 0.187; mean z = 0.70; Stouffer 
Z = 4.93 (p = 4.11 × 10-7). Or, for the original database (cor-
rected N = 51), a revised Winsorized mean ES of 0.186; 
mean z = 0.71; Stouffer Z = 5.05 (p = 2.21 × 10-7).
We also note that Howard (2018) removed studies #11 
and #48 because the procedure he used—“random-effects 
meta-analyses with inverse-variance weights”—cannot 
include studies “with sample sizes of two” (p. 225; italics 
added). We see no justification for the removal of studies 
merely for the sake of a test, and stress that these two stud-
ies are not outliers. One study (#11) has a zero effect and, 
more importantly, the other (#48) happens to have a positive 
value, with a medium ES of .474. We also point out that, 
conventionally, in a random-effects model, one must justify 
the elimination of studies as outliers only on precise theo-
retical or methodological grounds, and not on the basis of 
their statistical distribution.
What we note throughout the various decisions made for 
one reason or another in Howard’s paper is an unwarranted 
(apart from Van de Castle, 1971), systematic stripping down 
of the database of studies that mainly happen to demon-
strate positive effects—studies which would ordinarily go 
towards supporting the psi hypothesis—whereas other 
methods that we have suggested are less severe on sen-
sitive effects and/or do not require outlier removal—small 
wonder Howard arrives at the conclusion that “the results 
are more precarious than previously believed” (p. 228).
Finally, Howard (2018) refers to a change made to the da-
tabase concerning a study by Watt (2014). We reported an 
ES of 0.156 (z = 2.20) in our original database because Watt 
(2014) had specifically stated that “data from any partici-
pants who did not complete four trials were discarded” (p. 
105). But Watt and Valášek (2015) then adjusted this figure 
downwards by including those data that Watt initially ex-
cluded due to her exclusion criterion. Originally, we abided 
by Watt’s criterion (see Storm et al., 2017, p. 132) but, to 
avoid complications, we opted for a lower figure in keep-
ing with Howard’s conservatism (NB: the above Winsorized 
calculations were made using these adjusted values). On a 
revised N of 219 (up from 200), and three more hits (bring-
ing the total hits up to 67), we see that Howard’s effect size 
figure of .091, reported in his database, is incorrect, and 
should read 0.124¸ as reported in Watt and Valášek (p. 106; 
they actually reported a rounded-down figure of “0.12”). 
Also, Howard reported 247 trials, which should be 219. We 
spotted the source of the error in Howard’s correspondence 
with the first author: “To calculate the Watt effect size, I add-
ed the additional 47 [sic] observations to the prior 200” (M. 
C. Howard, personal communication, November 5, 2018). 
The change from 0.156 to 0.124 results in a very slight drop 
in mean ES for our database of .195 (down from .196, which 
we had rounded up to .20).
Howard’s (2018) decision to use the lower figure for Watt 
(2014) is a further instance of a posteriori decision making 
regarding analysis strategy that in each case serves to re-
duce effect sizes. Would Watt’s (2014) additional data have 
been included if they had served to inflate her reported ef-
fect size? We suspect not. Would the alternative methods 
for identifying and removing outliers referred to by Howard 
(p. 225), but not utilised in the analysis he presented, have 
produced similar reductions in effect size? We suspect not. 
Of course, it is possible to offer a plausible rationale for the 
choice that is made, but this does not protect against ques-
tionable research practices (cf. Steegen et al., 2016). No 
doubt another analyst with different motivations could have 
made arbitrary decisions that would serve to give inflated 
versions of the effect sizes we reported.
3.2. Weighting of Studies
Howard (2018) also argues that inverse-variance weighting 
is conducted because more credibility is attached to large 
studies (with smaller sampling variances) than smaller stud-
ies (with larger sampling variances). Since small studies are 
potentially more susceptible to publication bias, this can 
lead to small studies being viewed with suspicion, especial-
ly if they are significant. Howard noted that “no excessively 
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large-n studies overpowered the current results” (p. 225), 
but at the small-n end of the spectrum, he states: “Child and 
Krippner produced multiple outstanding effects in small-n 
studies, including effect sizes of .68, .72, and two of .94” 
(p. 228). However, it is important to recognise that small n 
studies may differ from large n studies in more respects than 
simply sample size, effect size, and susceptibility to sam-
pling error. For example, many of the studies with n < 15 
involved participants who were pre-selected based on prior 
performance, whereas no studies with n > 15 did so. How-
ard’s strategy seems analogous to expressing doubt about 
goal-scoring in football matches because all observations 
involving intensive research with small samples of profes-
sional footballers have been rendered dubious by inappro-
priate generalisations from larger scale but less intensive 
studies of people who claim no particular footballing ability.
Likewise, we argue that small-n studies provide a more 
bespoke test of ostensibly psi-gifted participants than 
large-n studies, as more time and attention is given to single 
cases or small-n groups. J. B. Rhine (1948/1954) brought 
attention to this problem when he stated:
We destroy the phenomena in the very act of trying to 
demonstrate them. Evidently the tests themselves get in 
the way of the abilities they are designed to measure. (p. 
161)
Rhine’s comment very readily suggests that ‘conveyor-belt 
testing’, consisting of multiple trials per participant, may be 
a disheartening process for participants (and/or experiment-
ers). But even if there might be some statistical justification 
for authors “to conduct large-n studies of ESP in dreams” 
(Howard, 2018, p. 228), large-n studies could mean: (a) 
few participants with many trials; (b) many participants with 
many trials; or (c) many participants with few trials—Howard 
is not clear on which might be preferred, but we suggest 
they all carry the risk of decline effects to varying degrees.
Notwithstanding this problem, we query the premise that 
a number of small-n studies is essentially bad for parapsy-
chology, even though meta-analysis can make such short 
work of them. Essentially, we can re-model the data to test 
this hypothesized alternative outcome, which would have 
the effect of giving grouped MDL studies smaller sampling 
variances. It should first be noted that we can use as a con-
trol, the mean SE (0.146) of the 12 MDL small-n studies (not 
including the Van de Castle study), each study ranging from 
two to eight trials. Based on year of publication, we split up 
the 12 small-n MDL studies, and formed three groups of 
‘moderate’ size (which Howard sets at 15 to 99 trials). These 
three groups comprised:
 ▪ five studies with a total of 47 trials (one by Ullman, 
 1969; two by Ullman & Krippner, 1969; and two by 
 Ullman, Krippner, & Feldstein, 1966);
 ▪ four studies with a total of 36 trials (Krippner, Honor- 
 ton, & Ullman, 1972, 1973; Krippner, Ullman, & Honor- 
 ton, 1971; Krippner, Honorton, Ullman, Masters, & 
 Houston, 1971);
 ▪ three studies with a total of 18 trials (all three by 
 Ullman, Krippner, & Vaughan, 1973).
The respective SE’s are 0.058, 0.066, and 0.094, which are 
(a) considerably smaller than the mean SE for the 12 small-n 
MDL studies of 0.146; and (b) in the vicinity of the non-MDL 
mean SE of 0.068 (minus the small-n studies). This crude 
demonstration suggests too much emphasis can be placed 
on the variance issue.
4. Discussion
For the rest of this response to Howard (2018), we will dis-
cuss some key issues about methodology and the implica-
tions and ramifications of Howard’s findings, as well as our 
own. First, Howard carried out only a partial reanalysis of 
our meta-analysis, and did not clearly state his research ob-
jectives, other than to recalculate our effects using our Ap-
pendix A (Storm et al., 2017, pp. 138-139) to test the robust-
ness of our findings. However, his reanalysis only considers 
our first four hypotheses, but not the remaining four. We 
make the very minor point that Howard’s Results section, 
while it does differentiate between Primary and Additional 
analyses, might have been easier to follow if the specific 
planned analyses had been outlined in the Introduction.
Second, Howard (2018) stated:
Analyses were conducted to probe the effect of sample 
size on study results. Three groups were created that log-
ically appeared in the database. The first included studies 
with a sample size over 99 (k = 7), the second included 
studies with a sample size of 15 to 99 (k = 13), and the 
third included studies with a sample size below 15 (k = 
24). (p. 227)
Howard regards these groups as “logically” appearing in the 
database, which is debatable because sub-divisions of this 
nature tend to be relatively arbitrary. There are a number of 
other (logical) ways to form groups. For example: we might 
accept the group with sample size over 99 (k = 7), but the 
second could include studies with a sample size of 10 to 99 
(k = 20), and the third could include studies with a sample 
size ≤ 8 (k = 17).
Third, Howard (2018) stated that,
The significant effect for clairvoyance studies was further 
investigated for robustness. The effect would no longer 
be statistically significant (r = .15 – 19, p > .05) when 
removing any of five studies (Dalton et al., 1999; Dalton 
et al., 2000; Kanthamani & Khilji, 1990; Roe et al., 2007; 
Sherwood et al., 2000). This suggests that this significant 
effect is somewhat precarious. (p. 226)
Howard’s strategy is to delete outlying scores/studies in or-
der to find support for the null hypothesis, presumably on 
the basis that any one of these studies on its own is doing 
all the work of making clairvoyance look like a real effect. 
However, what is good for the goose, is good for the gan-
der, and the arbitrary removal of a given study just because 
it has a positive r could equally be used to seek support for 
the alternative (psi) hypothesis for the two non-significant 
subsets (telepathy and precognition) by seeing what hap-
pens when non-significant (negative r) studies are removed 
one at a time.
Fourth, Howard (2018) stated that,
the 34 studies published in parapsychology journals pro-
duced an inverse-variance weighted effect size of .11 …, 
whereas the 10 studies published in non-parapsychology 
journals produced an inverse-variance weighted effect 
size of .02 (p. 228)
Although the author only suggests “this difference may be 
significant”, and he reports a “marginally significant result” 
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(p. 228), the implication may be that non-parapsychology 
journals are more methodologically stringent in their refer-
eeing practices, and so these latter studies offer a more ac-
curate estimate of the real effect size. Alternatively, this ‘dif-
ference’ might be thought to reflect the notion that orthodox 
(“non-parapsychology”) journals are more inclined to pub-
lish psi studies that obtain null results (although parapsy-
chology journals have had explicit policies to publish null 
results for over 30 years; see Broughton, 1987). Our view is 
that this difference has little to say about psi, but is indica-
tive of an anti-psi bias in the mainstream publishing world, 
rather than a pro-psi bias in the parapsychology world.
We close with a response to Howard’s (2018) assertion:
Given that psi research is still heavily doubted in most 
academic outlets, it is safe to say that psi effects are not 
typically noticeable to the naked eye of the careful ob-
server. (p. 224)
Since surveys consistently show high levels of belief in a 
range of paranormal phenomena among the general public, 
and personal experience is cited as a primary driver of that 
experience (Castro, Burrows, & Wooffitt, 2014; Pechey, & 
Halligan, 2012), it seems safe to say that in situ some psi 
effects are typically noticeable to the naked eye. However, 
we concur with Howard with respect to laboratory-based 
evidence for psi, where psi effects are inferred from cumula-
tive statistical deviations from chance expectation. We thus 
commend the author for his willingness to investigate the 
sensitive topic of dream-ESP, and we note his adherence 
to transparent research practices, as the means by which 
these subtle effects can be discerned and debated. Indeed, 
it is this transparency that has enabled us to raise concerns 
about Howard’s inclusion/exclusion strategy, which seems 
to us post hoc and open to expectancy bias; his estimates 
of the number and impact of unpublished studies, which 
shows a lack of familiarity with the parapsychological com-
munity and its history of publishing nonsignificant outcomes; 
and his concerns about the smaller ES with larger n studies, 
which ignores other factors that covary with that parameter 
and offer plausible explanations for that difference. Never-
theless, we do agree with Howard that this research topic is 
worthy of continued investigation, that research designs still 
have potential for further methodological improvements, 
and that the evaluation of such research would benefit from 
a clear consensus on the most appropriate meta-analytic 
approach.
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